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Abstract 
This report describes the results of interviews with 100 Army reservists who 
stopped participating in weekend drills. Based on socialization and psychological 
contract theories, an interview protocol was constructed. Respondents answered 
open ended questions regarding the reasons and timing of their non-participation. 
Problems were identified in the recruiting process, the newcomer orientation 
program, leadership, and communication. Despite their decisions to stop 
participating, 70% of the respondents stated they would return to a unit if their 
reasons for leaving were corrected. Recommendations are offered regarding. 
procedures and policies which should reduce unsatisfactory participation in the 
Army Reserve, saving significant recruiting and training resources. 
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This study is a qualitative investigation into one of the Army Reserve’s most f 
costly and urgent personnel readiness issues, unsatisfactory participation of junior 
enlisted reservists. This major source of attrition needs to be understood so policy 
makers can address specific causes of unsatisfactory participation. Other studies (see 
Kocher and Thomas, 1999) have .detailed the demographic characteristics of 
unsatisfactory participants. This research focuses on the experiences of reservists during 
their fust year in the unit to determine the reasons reservists decide to stop participating 
in drills. The results of 100 interviews of unsatisfactory participants point to many 
avenues for reducing this element of attrition, potentially increasing personnel readiness . 




The end of the Cold War generated military budget constraints and downsizing Ji 
that resulted in the active force having to rely increasingly on Reserve component support 
during operational missions. Soon after, the Gulf War required the largest Reserve 
activation and mobilization since WWII. These events marked the beginning of a change 
in the mission of the Army Reserve, and its integration into the Department of Defense 
@OD) Total Force Policy. The primary objectives of the Total Force Policy are to 
maintain a small, active, peacetime force able to meet the National Military Strategy, and 
to integrate the capabilities of active and reserve forces into a more cost-effective fighting 
force. To meet these objectives, increasingly more combat support and combat service 
support capabilities have been transferred to the Reserve. Approximately 4 1 % of the 
Army’s support forces are currently in the Reserve (L‘Operation Desert Storm” 1992,s). 
As evidence of their new role, the Army Times recently reported that an average of 1,800 
reservists are deployed on any given day since January of 1996, and approximately 2,079 
reservists are currently serving in Bosnia. 
With the increased reliance on the Army Reserve, unit readiness and deployability 
have become vital concerns to Army leadership. A 1995 Rand Report indicated that the 
average Reserve unit activated for the Gulf War had a qualified personnel fill of only 
63%. To be qualified to deploy, a unit must have a qualified personnel fill rate of 85%. 
The shortfall was due to unfilled positions (1 1%), and positions filled with soldiers 
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waiting to complete training to be duty qualified (26%) (Orvis et al., 1995, xii). These 
shortfalls can be attributed to a high personnel turnover rate in the Reserves, primarily 
due to reservists who decide to stop participating in their units for a variety of reasons. A 
reduction in personnel turnover would ultimately result in budget savings, as well as an 
overall increase in total force readiness. 
* 
The mission of the U.S. Army Reserve is to “meet Department of the Army @A) 
contingency operations or mobilization requirements” (AR 140-1 1). As the draw down 
of the Total Force continues and the potential for regional conflicts requiring the short 
notice deployment of large numbers of soldiers increases, the Army will have to rely 
increasingly on the Reserve to filyaugment force and mission requirement gaps. 
Currently, the Reserve is the Army’s primary source of combat support (CS) and combat 
service support (CSS) assets. According to one Rand Report, the Reserve Component 
will constitute 39 percent of the nation’s defense force in fiscal year 1999 (“Trends” 2). 
The issue of Reserve readiness, then, is critical to our national military strategy, and is of 
great concern to congressional policy makers. 
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RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION OF RESERVISTS 
f 
Recruiting starts the joining process for a potential recruit, and retention “is the 
cornerstone of personnel readiness” (RFPB 41). This section addresses the processes and 
policies of recruiting and retaining a new reservist in order to lay the foundation to examine 
potential causes of personnel turnover. It also identifies recruiting agencies, and the specific 
responsibilities of recruiters and key unit members to integrate the new reservist into the unit. 
Recruiting OrganizationsProcess 
Unlike the Active Army, which only accesses soldiers through the United States 
Army Recruiting Command (USAREC), the Reserve Component has three organizations 
responsible for Reserve accessions. These agencies include USAREC, Department of the 
Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM), and the Army Reserve Personnel Command 
(ARPERCOM). USAREC, the only organization in which recruiters access active and 
reserve soldiers, accounts for the majority of all reserve accessions. PERSCOMs role in the 
process is to use in-service recruiters located at transition points to encourage soldiers 
leaving the active Army to join the Reserve. ARPERCOM manages the IRR database and 
also recruits reservists for the Selected Reserve by screening the IRR database for members 
eligible to fill unit shortages. 
The role of the recruiter in these organizations, located in offices throughout the 
country and overseas, is to be a uniformed representative of the Army and to positively and 
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accurately portray military life (“Military Recruiting, 1994, 13). Recruiters canvass 
prospective recruits through means such as making presentations at local high schools, 
advertising at community events, and contacting individuals directly. Additionally, the 
Army Reserve is advertising and recruiting through a website on the Internet, which allows 
interested individuals to contact recruiters in their areas. 
Y 
After individuals have decided to enlist, the recruiter registers them for processing 
at the Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS). Processing at the MEPS for the recruits 
includes taking a standardized test (the Armed Services Vocational Battery /Armed Forces 
Qualification Test), which measures a soldier’s quality and trainability, and taking a medical 
exam (“Military Recruiting,” 1994,12). Finally, the recruits choose or are assigned d MOS 
based on their test scores and medical qualifications. After the recruit has a MOS, an Army 
representative produces a contract for either the Delayed Entry Program (DEP) or immediate 
reserve or active duty. The DEP primarily allows enlistees to resolve scheduling 
complications and allows recruiters to coordinate allocations for initial entry training 
(Mitchell, 1994,22). 
Recruiting is a proactive program designed to enlist the most qualified soldiers into 
the Reserve and Active Components. Recruiters and other service representatives in the 
recruiting process form an enlistee’s first impressions and expectations of the Army Reserve. 
The recruiting process, however, is only the first step in the retention process. 
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Retention Process 
Retention can be defined as “the sum of leadership actions that create a positive 
training environment and influence soldiers to continue serving in the USAR, while 
enhancing units’ personnel readiness” (USARC 140-6, 1997, 3). An effective retention 
program, therefore, is critical to personnel readiness. The retention process begins with the 
assignment of new reservists from one of the accessioning agencies, and continues 
throughout the career of the soldier. U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) recognizes 
that reservists’ anxieties can be reduced through the proper integration of a soldier into a unit, 
and research demonstrates that first impressions of a unit impact a reservist’s decision to 
continue to participate (USARC 140-6, 1997,6). Designated individuals in the unit have 
responsibilities, outlined in USARC Regulation 140-6, to ensure a new reservist is properly 
integrated into the unit. The majority of these responsibilities are included in the sponsorship 
program. The sponsorship program requires 100% sponsorship of all new reservists, and 
events are documented on a sponsorship checklist (USARC Form 62-R; Sponsor’s Guide 
and In processing Checklist), which must be completed and placed in unit files. The 
recruiter and the unit interface when the recruiter escorts the enlistee to the unit and is 
documented on the sponsorship checklist. 
Whereas the recruiter is one of the first military members the new reservist 
encounters, the unit Full Time Support (FTS) personnel, or unit administrators are usually 
the fist members in the unit a reservist meets. The unit administrator‘s responsibilities start 
before the member arrives at the unit. He should have made prior contact with the soldier, 
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provided a welcome lettedpacket, and coordinated with the First Sergeant for a sponsor. 
According to USARC Regulation 140-6, the member’s first meeting with the unit 
administrator gives the soldier a “feeling of what to expect in the unit” (USARC 140-6, 1997, y 
7). The unit administrator welcomes the soldier, administratively in-processes the soldier, 
gives the soldier the name and phone number of the sponsor, and answers any immediate 
questions the soldier may have 
The sponsorship program is a commander’s program. The commander has individual 
requirements, as well as responsibility for the administration of the overall program in the 
unit. The unit commander is responsible not only for personally welcoming the soldier 
during the first drill, but also for conducting an interview with the soldier that includes 
informing him of the missiodorganization of the unit and determining the soldier’s goals and 
expectations of the Reserve. Additionally, the unit commander must ensure that soldiers 
understand service obligations and participation requirements. The soldier must sign a 
certificate (Certificate of Acknowledgment of Service Requirements for Individuals 
Enlisting, Re-enlisting, or Transferring to Troop Program Units of the US. Army Reserve), 
to acknowledge receipt of the orientation (AR135-91, 1994, 11). Finally, the commander 
should questions the soldier to determine the effectiveness of the unit sponsorship program. 
The First Sergeandsenior Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) of the unit also plays an 
important role in the integration of the new soldier. He selects quality soldiers familiar with 
the unit to serve as sponsors, and trains the sponsors using the plan in USARC Pam 140-1. 
He, too, conducts a personal interview with the soldier in which he explains contract 
8 
requirements, benefit and incentive plans such as the Montgomery GI Bill (education 
assistance), and unit standards and training requirements. 
z 
First line supervisors also have many responsibilities that impact a new soldier’s first 
impressions of the unit. These responsibilities include contacting the soldier prior to the first 
drill to welcome the soldier to the unit, notifying the soldier of the drill schedule, and 
ensuring the soldier has no problems such as a lack of transportation that would prevent him 
~ 
from attending drill. Additionally, during the first drill, the first line supervisor’s 
~ 
responsibilities include explaining the soldier’s role in the section, introducing the soldier to 
coworkers, and explaining to the soldier what he should expect during initial entry t r w g .  
The supervisor should also ensure the soldier completes in-processing. 
Although the first line supervisor has a long-term relationship with the soldier, it is 
Sponsor 
responsibilities include contacting the soldier before the first drill to inform the soldier of 
what to expect at the first drill, and providing the soldier a home phone number in case he 
. the sponsor who influences a soldier’s short-term expectations of the unit. 
has any questions. During the first drill the sponsor escorts the soldier throughout in- 
processing and shows the soldier around the unit. The sponsor also introduces the soldier 
to coworkers. 
The responsibilities of key unit personnel in the sponsorship program are outlined 
in USARC Regulation 140-6, and require documentation on the sponsorship checklist. 
The redundancies designed into the sponsorship program underscore the USARC’S 
9 
commitment to ensuring new soldiers form good first impressions and are properly 




PARTICIPATION IN THE SELECT RESERVE 
Y 
Unsatisfactory Participation 
A soldier is declared an unsatisfactory participant when he incurs nine unexcused 
absences from unit training assemblies within a one year period, or fails to attend or 
complete annual training (AR 135-91,1994,12). Failure to attend or complete AT can result 
in a soldier’s prosecution under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. For unexcused 
absences, however, the unit commander initiates action against the soldier by selecting one 
of two options: 1) If the unit commander determines the soldier has the potential for usel l  
service, the soldier will be transferred to the IRR; 2) If the soldier has no potential for useful 
service, the soldier will be discharged from the Reserve. In addition, the unit commander 
has the option to reduce the soldier’s rank under either option. 
Costs of Unsatisfactory Participation 
Unsatisfactory participation directly impacts limited budget dollars as well as total 
force readiness. Currently, the costs associated with recruiting and training a non-prior 
service soldier are $19,432 to recruit, and $41,568 to train for a total of $60,000 per non- 
prior service soldier (USARC, 1997). In contrast, recruiting and retraining prior service 
soldiers costs $6,700 per soldier. In either case, the costs of nonparticipation quickly 
consume limited budget dollars. Despite force reductions, enlisted loss rates remain high. 
Losses result in increases in recruiting and training costs as vacant positions must be filled 
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with qualified soldiers. More importantly, assigned strength and duty MOS qualified 
shortfalls degrade unit readiness. This is significant, as many vital support assets are located 
in the Reserve. Determining the causes of unsatisfactory participation and implementing I 
programs and procedures to reduce tumover will ultimately result in significant budget 




To better understand the issue of unsatisfactory participation, it is useful to review 
relevant theoretical research to establish a fiamework from which to investigate the problem. 
Several different organizational management theories are examined to establish this 
fiamework for analysis. This section begins with a discussion of the theories of 
psychological contracts, unmet expectations, and stages of socialization. Finally, an 
integrated model is introduced which will shape the design of the study of unsatisfactory 
participation. The model integrates psychological contracts and met expectation theory, 
realistic job preview research, and stages of socialization into a specific fiamework which 
will be used to understand the process of turnover in the Army Reserve 
Psychological Contracts and Met Expectation Theory 
Just as an individual engaged in an exchange process has preconceived expectations 
of a fair exchange, a newcomer has expectations of fair exchange when joining an 
organization. These expectations can be thought of as a psychological contract between the 
newcomer and the organization. The psychological contract is continuously revised over 
time as a newcomer’s expectations approach reality. When a newcomer and/or an 
organization cannot resolve m e t  expectations, the newcomer may “break” the contract, and 
leave the organization. Understanding the role of the psychological contract, and the results 
of w e t  expectations as they apply to the joining process may help managers prevent 
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turnover. 
Kotter defines the psychological contract as “an implicit contract between an 
individual and his organization which specifies what each expects to give and receive from 
t 
each other in their relationship,” &otter, 1973,92). The newcomer may expect to receive a 
certain salary, advancement opportunities, challenging work, etc. In return, he expects to 
give his time, technical skills, commitment, etc. Rousseau further develops the concept, and 
defines the psychological contract as an “individual’s beliefs in a reciprocal obligation 
between the individual and the Organization,” and that the organization only provides the 
context for the creation of the contract (Rousseau, 1989,121). The psychological contract 
is based completely on the newcomer’s expectations about an organization’s obligations, and 
if not discussed, may be unknown to the organization. 
Factors that influence the formation of psychological contracts may be explicit or 
implied (Rousseau, 1989, 124). For example, an organization may explicitly promise a 
certain salary, and the newcomer will expect to receive the salary promised. Similarly an 
organization may be known for the excellent pay for its employees. Although just implied, 
the newcomer may expect to be paid well for his contributions. 
Problems occur when a newcomer’s expectations of the organization are unrealistic. 
To the newcomer, m e t  expectations equate to the failure of the organization to fulfill its 
obligations, and a violation of the psychological contract. In their concept of met expectation 
theory, Porter and Steers hypothesized that if a newcomer encounters more w e t  
14 
expectations than met expectations, the newcomer will become dissatisfied. Unlike the 
dissatisfaction resulting from unfair exchanges identified in equity theory, a violation of the 
psychological contract is a violation of trust a newcomer perceived to have been established 3 
with the organization (Rousseau, 1989,127). The degree of the dissatisfaction resulting fiom 
unmet expectations and broken trust is likely to result in the newcomer leaving the 
organization. Research by Wanous, Poland, Premack, and Davis confirms that met 
expectations positively correlate with job satisfaction and lower turnover (Wanous et. al, 
1992,288). 
Realistic Job Previews 
The realistic job preview (RJP) is one method employed to bring a newcomer’s 
expectations into congruence with organizational reality. The realistic job preview is an 
organizational strategy used to increase the amount and accuracy of information a newcomer 
receives about an organization to encourage him develop more realistic expectations 
(Wanous, 1977, 601). Traditional job previews, in contrast, portray the organization as 
favorably as possible to attract the most qualified applicants. Recruiting literature, for 
example, may depict the organization as an exciting place to work. These traditional job 
previews can foster the development of unrealistic expectations, and may result in wmet 
expectations, violation of a psychological contract, and turnover. Realistic job previews give 
applicants a “vaccination” to deflate newcomer expectations and provide a “small dose of 
organizational reality” (Jablin, 1987,688). Providing a more realistic preview of the job and 
the organization may increase the number of met expectations, which may translate into 
15 
increased job satisfaction. 
Stages of Socialization 
9 '  
Joining an organization entails a developmental process often termed socialization. 
Jablin proposes four stages of socialization: anticipatory socialization; organizational 
encounter; metamorphosis; and exit. These stages are characterized by the communication 
processes, which occur in each phase of development (Jablin, 1987,679). In the anticipatory 
stage, newcomers initially gather information about a job and an organization through 
sources such as family, fiiends, and the media. This process, defined by Jablin as vocational 
organizational communications socialization (VOCS), may provide the foundation for a 
newcomer's formation of first impressions and expectations about an organization. During 
the anticipatory socialization phase, newcomers continue to acquire information fiom 
organizational recruiters, other applicants, current employees, etc. These sources may or 
may not provide an accurate job preview for the newcomer, and may result in a newcomer 
developing distorted expectations. These distorted expectations may ultimately make the 
assimilation process more diEcult for the newcomer (Jablin, 1987,693). 
In the encounter phase, the newcomer learns his role, and organizational norms and 
expectations fiom his supervisor and coworkers. It is in this phase that the newcomer may 
experience surprise (Louis, 1980), or unmet expectations, which may prove difficult for a 
newcomer with inflated expectations (Jablin, 1987,695). 
The metamorphosis phase marks the newcomer's alignment of expectations to those 
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of the organization. In this phase the newcomer desires to be identified with the 
organization, and has internalized organizational values and behaviors. Whereas the 
newcomer only received information in previous phases, the newcomer now provides input 
and feedback to supervisors and coworkers in the organization. 
Jablin identifies his final stage of socialization as the exit fiom the organization. 
Little research exists identifying the communication factors, which contribute to an 
individual leaving an organization. Reasons individuals leave organizations may include 
personal issues, issues that may relate to some aspect of the organization, or both. He notes, 
however, that research in this area is necessary in order to recognize and remedy 
communication dissatisfaction before it results in turnover (Jablin, 1987,724). 
Integrated Model 
Combining the concepts of the Stages of Socialization and psychological contracts 
results in an integrated conceptual model (figure 1). This integrated model will be applied 
to the context of the Army Reserve, and will be used to study turnover and the problem of 
unsatisfactory participation. 
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Stages of Psychological Contracts and 
Socialization to the Army Reserve 
Contract Contract Contract Contract 
Creation Evaluation Revision furnment 
1 
Figure 1. Integrated model as a adapted from Ja-lin and Bar1 .as-Choplin 
The integrated model consists of Jablin's four stages. Each stage incorporates a phase 
of psychological contract development, and sources of information which contribute to the 
formation of newcomer expectations. In this formulation, the exit option occurs in the last 
three stages of socialization, as the newcomer to the Army Reserve may exit at any time, and 
may also re-enter the process. 
Applying the Army Reserve context to the stage of anticipatory socialization, the 
individual forms his initial expectations through interactions with recruiters, other applicants, 
and possibly peers who are members of the Reserve. After an individual is determined to 
be eligible to join the Reserve, a recruiter provides the individual information about the 
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military, the Reserve, and the jobs available. Individuals whose initial expectations are not 
met (a particular job is not available, for example), simply do not join, or may decide to join 
at a later date. Those individuals who perceive the information from the recruiter to be 
positive (meeting initial expectations formed through Jablin's VOCS, receiving a RJP, etc.), 
decide to join the Reserve. The recruiter may have told the recruit that he could have a 
particular job, or the recruit may have only perceived that the recruiter promised him a 
particular job. Regardless, the recruit creates a psychological contract of expectations based 
on the perceived agreements with the recruiter. Between the time the recruit joins and the 
time he reports to the unit, he continues to seek and process information, which contributes 
to his expectations and psychological contract. 
In the encounter stage, the recruit reports to his assigned unit. He begins to evaluate 
the psychological contract based on interactions with leaders and coworkers, and policies, 
standards, training, etc. In this stage, the new reservist may experience surprise ( m e t  
expectations) if reality is not correctly anticipated. As Jablin and Wanous noted, the more 
inflated the expectations, the more difficult this stage will be for the new reservist. If the 
new reservist cannot adjust his expectations to the realities of the unit, he may feel his 
psychological contract has been violated, experience extreme dissatisfaction, and finally, 
leave the organization. His dissatisfaction may be manifested through missing drills and 
being transferred out for unsatisfactory performance, failing to re-enlist, retiring, etc. 
Additionally, if his performance suffers as a result of his dissatisfaction, the Army may take 
initiatives, such as a discharge or forced transfer to inactive status. A feedback loop indicates 
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that the new reservist, if eligible, may re-enter the process. However, if the new reservist's 
psychological contract is met, he or she can adjust expectations to the reality of the unit, thus 
moving into the metamorphosis stage. Y 
In the metamorphosis stage, the new reservist seeks to be accepted as a member of 
the unit. This requires contract revision as he adjusts his expectations to those which reflect 
the attitudes and behaviors expected from members of the unit. As he further develops his 
role in the unit, he forms new expectations. For example, based on observations of others, 
he may perceive he should receive a reward (a medal) for tasks he has successllly 
performed over time. If the revised psychological contract of this new expectationis not 
met, the new reservist may decide to exit the unit. Again, if eligible, the new reservist may 
re-enter the process in 'the entry and encounter stage. The revision process is cyclical, and the 
new reservist is continually updating and evaluating his psychological contract. 
Finally, the reservist is fully accepted into the unit. His revised psychological 
contract has been fulfilled. He has internalized the expected behaviors and attitudes of the 
unit, and the unit has accepted him as a member. Through the contract revision process, he 
has been able to adjust his expectations to match reality. He also experiences job 
satisfaction, which may be manifested through good job performance, or his decision to re- 
enlist. 
The exit stage ideally comes after 20 or more years of service in the form of 
retirement. Alternately, it can come after six years, as an enlistment contract expires and is 
20 
not renewed. In the worst case, it can come in the anticipatory socialization phase, as some 
enlistees never show up at the unit. 
* 
The integrated conceptual model represents the socialization process and the 
psychological contract as they apply to the Army Reserve. The model, as well as the theories 
studied to develop the model, guides this research of the problem of unsatisfactory 
participation. 
21 
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METHODOLOGY 
This section details the design of the study, which is based on the integrated 
r 
conceptual model developed from relevant organizational management theories introduced 
in the previous section. The model is designed specifically to increase understanding of the 
process by which a new reservist enters and is assimilated into an Army Reserve unit and the 
circumstances under which a reservist becomes an unsatisfactory participant. Understanding 
why reservists leave the military may enable Army leadership to identify policies and 
procedures to reduce currently unacceptable high turnover rates. 
Design of the Study 
The research method chosen was a telephonic interview consisting of qualitative, 
open-ended questions which allowed opportunities to expand or probe responses. The target 
respondents were Army Reservists who had stopped attending drills within the past two 
years. 
Interview Protocol 
Previous research on the subject of turnover and nonparticipation has focused on 
archival data, or used large samples for a quantitative approach to the problem. A review of 
existing research revealed that no one has collected large amounts of data from interviews 
with unsatisfactory participants. The interview protocol was based on the stages of 
socialization and psychological contracts, and allowed for probing and capturing detailed 
23 
answers from the respondents (appendix 1). 
, Sampling Procedure 
9 
The sampling frame was a subset of the popdation of unsatisfactory participants 
chosen from a list provided by the USAR. A table of random numbers was used to generate 
the sample. The first random number selected was seven. The seventh person, and every 
subsequent seventh person on the two lists was called. 
Approximately every second person called generated the need to recall. If the call 
resulted in a number which was no longer in service, or in contacting a person unrelated to 
the subject, the name was crossed off the list. Approximately ten calls were required to 
generate each usable interview. 
Limitations of the Methodology 
The sample of 100 respondents is relatively small compared to the population of 
unsatisfactory participants. Also, as with any research method which involves interview 
protocols, both the questions and resulting data are subject to both the skill and interpretation 
of the researcher. Furthermore, the respondents in the sample who have failed to fulfill 
Reserve contract obligations may have attribution biases which place blame for their 
behavior on the institution or others rather than on themselves. Finally, the respondents 




This section presents the results of the analysis of the unsatisfactory participant 
sample. The integrated model provides the framework with which to organize the results. 
The subsections therefore include anticipatory socialization, encounter, metamorphosis, and 
exit. The subsidiary research questions, also organized using the integrated model, are 
addressed in the corresponding stage of the model. It should be noted that not all of the 
. responses will sum to 100 due to missing data. 
Anticipatory Socialization 
The anticipatory socialization stage of the model is characterized by the reservist 
receiving information from sources which form the newcomer’s first impressions and 
expectations of the Reserve. Jablin identifies the process by which individuals receive 
information prior to making first contact with anyone in an organization as vocational 
organizational communications (VOCS). Sources of information which contribute to VOCS 
include the media, promotional literature, family, friends, etc. All of these sources of 
information contribute to the creation of the reservist’s psychological contract, or 
expectations of the Reserve. The research questions in this stage explore the sources of 
information about the Reserve and the unit, and examine the role the recruiter plays in 
socializing the reservist. 
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1. What are the sources of information about the Army Reserve Program, and 
are they accurate? 
As illustrated in Figure 2,22% of the respondents reported they received information 
from in-serve recruiters (ISRs), and 41% reported they received information from local 
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Figure 2. Sources of information about the Reserve Program 
Figure 3 portrays that 47% and 21% reported that their source of information was 
accurate and somewhat accurate, while 21% reported their source as inaccurate. One 
reservist who reported he received inaccurate information responded, “I was told I would get 
an enlistment bonus, but never got it.” 
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Accurate Inaccurate Somew hat Did not get No info 
Accurate much info 
Response 
Figure 3. Accuracy of source of information about the Reserve Program 
A cross tabulation of the ‘sources of information’ and the ‘accuracy of information’ 
in Figure 4 revealed that 13 out of 22 (59%) reservists whose source was an in-skrvice 
recruiter received accurate information, 4 of the 22 received somewhat accurate information, 
and 4 of the 22 received inaccurate information. Most notably, while 19 of 41 (46%), and 
7 of 41 (17%) of reservists whose source was a recruiter received accurate and somewhat 
accurate information, 13 of 41 (32%) received inaccurate information. Of the 20% who 
received information fiom family and friends, all reported the information was accurate, or 
somewhat accurate. 
Didn’t get much info 
Info. missing 0 0 0 0 1 1  2 1 1  1 
Total 22 41 8 10 10 I 2 6 1  1 
Figure 4. Cross tabulation of source and accuracy 
27 
2. What are the sources of information about the Reserve unit, and are 
they accurate? J 
As depicted in Figure 5 ,  the majority of reservists learned about their Reserve unit 
fiom a local recruiter (39%), whereas only 3% learned about their unit fiom an in-service 
recruiter. In contrast to the high number who learned about the Reserve program fkom a 
fiiend or relative, only 9% learned about their unit fiom these sources. A significant number 









Figure 5. Sources of information about the Reserve unit 
Figure 6 illustrates that 4 1 % of reservists reported sources of information about their 
















Accurate Inaccurate Somw hat Did not get No info 
Response 
Accurate much info 
0 5 0 0 0 2f  0 3 2 3/ 
3 39 0 8 1 28 3 16 2 100 ’ 
I Figure 6. Accuracy of source about the Reserve unit 
I A cross tabulation of the ‘source of infomation about a unit’ and the ‘accuracy of the 
source’ in Figure 7 illustrates that 20 of 39 (51%) reported that the recruiter gave them 
accurate, or somewhat accurate, information as opposed to 6 of 39 (15%) who reported 
receiving inaccurate information from a recruiter. 
Figure 7. Cross tabulation of source of information about the unit and the accuracy of 
the source 
3. What is the role of the recruiter in anticipatory socialization? 
Two questions fiom the interview protocol were used to determine the role of the 
recruiter in the anticipatory socialization phase: 
4a. Did the recruiter take you to the unit? . 
Of the 77 reservists who were accessed by a recruiter, 61% (47 of 77) were escorted by a 
recruiter to their new units, and 38% (29 of 77) were not. One prior service reservist 
reported, " I went down to the unit on my own." f 
4b. Did the recruiter tell you about the unit's mission? 
Only 28 of 77 (36%) reported that the recruiter explained the mission of the unit to them, 
while 40 of 77 (52%) reported the recruiter did not. 
A cross tabulation of these variables reveals that 3 1% (24 of 77) of the recruiters 
explained the mission to reservists and escorted them to their units, while 29% (22 of 77) did 
neither. 
Don't Recall 
Figure 8. Cross tabulation of the variables 'did the recruiter tell you the mission of the 
unit' and 'did the recruiter take you to the unit' 
C. ENCOUNTER 
The encounter stage of the model begins when the reservist reports to his unit for the 
first time, and continues through the first training weekend. If the reservist's experiences in 
the unit do not meet his expectations, he may experience surprise ( m e t  expectations). 
During the anticipatory socialization stage, the reservist creates his psychological contract 
from his interactions with a recruiter, other applicants, etc. In the encounter stage, the 
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reservist evaluates his contract against those expectations for the first time. 
1. How well does the unit begin to integrate the reservist in the 
encounter stage? 
Y 
Response frequencies conducted on specific questions indicate how well the unit 
integrated the reservist. Questions on the interview protocol that address integration of the 
reservist include: 
6. On yourfirst training weekend: 
a. Was the unit expecting you? 
Of the 100 respondents, 69% of the reservists indicatecl the unit was expecting them, and 
18% indicated the unit was not. 
b. Did you get an orientation brief3 
Although 60% reported they received an orientation brief, 30% reported they did not . 
receive one. 
c. Did the commander talk to newcomers? 
The commander of the unit spoke to 62% of the new reservists, but did not speak to 28%. 
d. Did the unit appoint a sponsor to help you? 
Sponsors were assigned to 58% of the reservists, however, 32% did not receive one. 
d(1). Did the sponsor do a goodjob? 
Of the 58 reservists who received sponsors, 52% (30 of 58) reported the sponsor did a 
good job in-processing and assisting them, 16% reported the sponsor did a somewhat 
good job, while 22% (13 of 58) reported the sponsor did not do a good job. 
e. Did you get in-processed? 
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Finally, 71 % of the reservists were in-processed within the first two drill weekends they 
attended, and only 4% were never fully in-processed. A small number of reservists (8%) 
indicated that although they were in-processed before they exited the unit, the process took 
more than two drill weekends to complete. One reservist who did not receive uniforms when 
he was in-processed reported, “I couldn’t go to formations because I didn’t have uniforms.’’ 
Cross tabulations of these questions provide more detailed information about the 
quality of a unit’s integration plan. As depicted in Figure 9, only 50% of the reservists 
reported that both the commander talked to them and that they received an orientation brief, 
while 18% reported that they received neither. Eleven percent of resemists talked to the 
commander, but did not receive an orientation brief, and 9% received an orientation brief, 
but did not talk to the commander. 
Someone else did 
I I I I I I I 
Figure 9. Cross tabulation of the variables ‘did you receive an orientation brief’ and 
‘did the commander talk to newcomers’ 
The cross tabulation in Figure 10 illustrates that of the 69 reservists that reported the 
unit was expecting them, 45 of those reservists (65%) received a sponsor. Although the unit 
expected the arrival of 22% of reservists, none were assigned sponsors. 
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I 58 i 32 i 1 I 0 1 9 
Figure 10. Cross tabulation of the variables ‘unit expecting’ and ‘sponsor’ 
Finally, of the 58 reservists who received a sponsor, only 50% (29 of 58) thought the 
sponsor did a good job, while 22% (13 of 58) thought the sponsor did a poor job. One 
reservist who did not receive a sponsor reported that he “didn’t feel like part of the unit.” 
2. What is the nature of met and unmet expectations during the 
encounter stage, and do unmet expectations relate to the reasons for exiting during this 
stage? 
To characterize the nature of met and unmet expectations in a specific stage, cross 
tabulations of certain variables were conducted to identie what met and m e t  expectations 
occurred in each stage. Response fiequencies of these questions provided information about 
the reservists’ met and unmet expectations. The questions fiom the interview protocol which 
address met and unmet expectations and can be identified as occurring in a particular stage 
include: 
7b(l). Ifsomething was better than you expected, what was better? 
As shown in Figure 1 1, almost half (49%) of the respondents reported that they experienced 
something that was better than they expected. Of those 49 reservists, 25 noticed that 
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something was better during the encounter stage. Forty-four percent (1 1 of 25) noticed the 
people in the unit were friendlier than they expected. Less significantly, 16% (4 of 25) 
reported that the leadership was better than they expected, and 12% (3 of 25) reported that f ’ 
other benefits and opportunities (promotion, increased responsibility, etc.) were better. Only 
one reservist reported that nothing was better than what he expected. One reservist reported 
that the officers in his chain of command, “treated me like a human being instead of a rank.” 
~ 
Figure 11. Frequency of ‘what was better than expected’ for reservists during the 
encounter stage. 
c(l) Ifsomething was worse than what you expected, what was worse? 
Ninety-two respondents reported that something was worse than they expected. As 
illustrated in Figure 12,42 noticed something was worse than expected during the first drill. 
When asked what was worse, 29% (12 of 42) answered leadership and 21% (9 of 42) 
answered training. As one reservist reported, “all we did was sit there and read the paper all 
day--we didn’t accomplish anything.” Ten percent (4 of 42) reservists responded that in- 
processing was slow/inefficient, and another 10% answered that unit enforcement standards 
were too low. 
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Response 
gure 12. Frequency of ‘what was worse than expected’ during the encounter stage 
9a. What was your main reason for stopping? 
As illustrated in Figure 13, 1 1 reservists exited during the encounter stage. Of the 11 
reservists, 36% (4 of 11) stopped participating because of the lack of meaningful training. 
One reservist reported that the unit did not seem to have a training plan, and as a result, 
‘%me was slow and monotonous at drill.” Two exited due to poor leadership 
treatment/skills. Another reservist reported that instead of being officially notified of his 
promotion by someone in the chain of command, “I found out I was promoted on my LES 
s 
Fi 
(Leave and Earnings Statement).” Finally, two reservists exited because of transportation 
problems. 
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Figure 13. Frequency of ‘why did you stop exithtop participating’ during the 
encounter stage 
A cross tabulation of the variables ‘what was worse than you expected’ and ‘why did 
you stop participating’ provides information as to whether m e t  expectations relate to 
reasons reservists exit during the encounter stage. As illustrated in Figure 14,2 ofthe 11 
reservists who exited during the encounter stage noted that training was worse than they 
expected, and then identified training as the reason they exited the unit. Similarly, 1 of the 
11 reservists noted that leadership was worse than he expected, and also identified leadership 
as the reason he exited the unit. Two reservists reported that the atmosphere was 
unchallenging, with one exiting because of leadership and the other exiting due to training. 
A cross tabulation of the variables ‘what was worse than you expected’ and ‘why did 
you stop participating’ provides information as to whether m e t  expectations relate to 
reasons reservists exit during the encounter stage. As illustrated in Figure 14,2 of the 11 
reservists who exited during the encounter stage noted that training was worse than they 
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expected, and then identified training as the reason they exited the unit. Similarly, 1 of the 
1 1 reservists noted that leadership was worse than he expected, and also identified leadership 
as the reason he exited the unit. Two reservists reported that the atmosphere was not 
challenging, with one exiting because of leadership and the other exiting due to training. 
hat Worse Leadership Training Atmosphere Unchallenging Enforcement Stds Too Low Atmosphere Too Challenging Total 
hv StOD 
Genl Dissatisfaction 
Figure 14. Cross tabulation of the variables ’ what was worse than you expected’ and 
‘why did you exit/stop participating’ 
3. What attempts did reservists who left during the encounter stage make to 
remedy dissatisfaction, and what actions did leadership take to resolve problems? 
Of the 100 respondents, 11 left before the second drill. A cross tabulation of the 
variables ‘when did you stop’ and ‘did you talk to the chain of command about your 
dissatisfaction’ revealed that 64% (7 of 11) talked to someone about their dissatisfaction, 
while the other 4 reservists did not. Figure 15 identifies who in the chain of command the 
reservist talked to about his dissatisfaction. Of the 7 reservists who left in the encounter 
stage and talked to someone, 3 (43%) spoke to the first sergeant (lSG), followed by 2 (29%) 
who spoke to either the unit administrator or ‘unit administrative personnel. 
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1 SG Squad Ldr UNAdrrin NCO Recruiter 
Response 
Figure 15. Frequency of ‘who did you talk to in the chain of command’ for reservists 
who exited during the encounter stage 
The response frequency of the variable ‘what did leadership do’ revealed that the way 
leadership in the units handled the reservists was almost evenly distributed. For 2 of the 7 
(29%) reservists, leadership took a specific action to rectify the problem. For example, the 
commander excused one of the reservist’s unexcused absences. For another 2 (29”/0> 
reservists, leadership indicated that they would be transferred/discharged without a penalty. 
Still another 2 reservists reported that leadership did not do anything to resolve the 
dissatisfaction, and 1 reservist reported that leadership ignored his dissatisfaction, or “gave 
J’ 
me the brush-off.’’ 
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Specific Action Transfer w lout Brush-off Did Nothing 
Response 
knalty 
Figure 16. Frequency of 'what did the chain of command (COC) do' for reservists who 
exited during the encounter stage 
D. METAMORPHOSIS . 
The encounter stage transitions to the metamorphosis stage after the reservist's first 
drill, and continues until the reservist is assimilated into the unit. The length of the 
metamorphosis stage differs for every reservist, and is a h c t i o n  of how well and how fast 
the reservist can revise his m e t  expectations to conform to the norms and realities of the 
unit. 
1. What is the nature of met and unmet expectations during the metamorphosis 
stage, and do unmet expectations relate to the reasons for exiting during this stage? 
Similar to the organization of the encounter subsection, this section answers the same 
questions from the interview protocol in order to characterize met and w e t  expectations 
in the metamorphosis stage. 
7b(l) Ifsomething was better than you expected, what was better? 
Of the 49 reservists who reported something was better than they expected, 13 of the 49 
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(29%) noticed something was better during the metamorphosis stage. As illustrated in 
Figure 17, the reservists in the metamorphosis stage noted the same things that the reservists 
in the encounter stage noted. Of the 13 reservists who noticed something was better during * 
the metamorphosis stage, 2 (1 5%) reservists noticed the people were fkiendlier. One reservist 
reported that he was surprised by the great “esprit de corps’’ in his new unit. Two reservists 
noticed that the leadership was better, 2 reservists noticed other benefits/opportunities were 
better, and 2 reservists noticed the training was better than expected. 
Response 
Figure 17. Frequency of ‘what was better than expected’ for reservists during the 
metamorphosis stage 
7c(l) Ifsomething was worse than you expected, what was worse? 
Of the 92 respondents who noticed something was worse than they expected, 34 reservists 
noticed something was worse than expected during the metamorphosis stage. As shown in 
Figure 18,9 of the 34 (26%) reservists noticed the training was worse, 6 (1 8%) noticed the 
administrative processing in the unit was worse, and 5 (15%) noticed the leadership was 
worse. One reservist reported that he felt he was “just a number on a strength chart,” and 
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that the leadership "didn't seem to care." 
IL 
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Figure 18. Frequency of 'what was worse than expected' for reservists during the 
metamorphosis stage 
9a. m a t  was your main reason for stopping? 
As depicted in Figure 19, 85 reservists exited during the metamorphosis stage. Of the 85 
reservists, 15 (18%) stopped participating because of poor training, 13 (15%) stopped 
participating due to a conflict with either a job or school, and 13 (15%) stopped participating 
due to poor leadership. A reservist reported that there was such a lack of leadership 
discipline in his unit that, "everyone called each other by their first names," and that the 














Frequency of ‘why did you exit/stop participating during the 
Just as in the encounter section, a cross tabulation of the variables ‘what was worse 
than you expected’ and ‘why did you stop participating’ provides insight as to whether m e t  
expectations relate to reasons reservists exit during the metamorphosis stage. Although 85 
.reservists exited during the metamorphosis stage, Figure 20 only illustrates the most relevant 
information fiom the cross tabulation. As depicted in the bold, italicized numbers in Figure 
20,36% (25 of 70) exited as a result of an m e t  expectation. 
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w h y  Stop Unfair Conflict 
Policy JoblSchool Ldrshp 
What worse 
Ldrshp 1 2 7 
Trig 2 3 2 
Not Given SchooVMOS 1 0 0 
Trans 0 0 0 
Not Given Gen’l Indiv. In 
Tng SchooVMOS Trans Processing Dissat. COC Money Total 
Figure 20. Cross tabulation of ‘what was worse than expected’ and ‘why did you stop 
participating’ for the metamorphosis stage 
2. What attempts did reservists who left during the metamorphosis stage make 
to remedy dissatisfaction, and what actions did leadership take to resolve problems? 
As discussed, 85 of the respondents left during the metamorphosis stage. A cross 
tabulation of the variables ‘when did you stop’ and ‘did you talk to the chain of command 
about your dissatisfaction’ revealed that 59 (69%) of the reservists talked to someone in the 
chain of command about their dissatisfaction, and 24 reservists did not. One soldier who 
talked to the first sergeant about his dissatisfaction said “he told me he’d talk to someone and 
get back to me-but he never did.” Figure 21 identifies who in the chain of command the 
reservists talked to about their dissatisfaction. Of the 59 reservists who spoke to someone, 
13 (22%) spoke to their platoon sergeant. One reservist who talked to his platoon sergeant, 
however, noted that “he agreed with me, but I don’t think it went above him.” Eleven (1 9%) 
reservists spoke to the first sergeant (1 SG), and 10 (1 7%) spoke to the commander. 
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Figure 21. Frequency of ‘who did you talk to’ for reservists who exited during the 
metamorphosis stage 
The response frequency of the variable ‘what did leadership do’ in Figure 22 revealed 
the manner in which leadership handled the reservists who left the unit. Of the 59 reservists 
who spoke to someone, 15 (25%) reported that the chain of command did nothing, while 12 
(20%) reported that the chain of command said they would take a specific action to remedy 
the dissatisfaction. Seven reservists reported that the chain of command told them there was 
nothing they could do, and 4 reservists reported that the chain of command ignored them, or 
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Figure 22. Frequency of 'what did the chain of command do' for reservists who exited 
during the metamorphosis stage 
E. EXIT 
When a reservist decides to stop participating in the unit, he has made a decision 
to exit the selected reserve system. Exiting is not a stage in the model, but is an outcome 
that usually results from dissatisfaction, and can occur in any stage of the model. This 
section provides information about the actions a unit usually takes after a reservist exits. 
1. After the reservist exited the unit, did anyone personally contact him? 
Answers to the following questions from the interview protocol will provide 
information to answer this question. 
I la.  After you stopped attending, did anyone personally @ to get you to 
return? 
A frequency distribution for this question showed that 41% of the reservists reported that 
someone did try to get them to return to the unit. Fifty-nine percent, however, reported that 
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no one attempted to get them to return. A reservist who was not personally contacted 
reported that the chain of command, “didn’t even know I wasn’t going-I guess they didn’t 
even care.” Another reservist who was only sent form letters advised leadership to ‘‘find out 
what the problem is and help the soldier resolve it-a letter just pisses the soldier off.” 
I Ib. Who tried to get you to return? 
Figure 26 illustrates that of the 41 reservists that reported someone did try to get them to 
return, 10 of the 41 (24%), reported that their platoon sergeant was the one who contacted 
them. Similarly, 8 of the 41 (20%) respondents noted that another sergeant in the chain of 
command contacted them. In contrast, only 4 of the 41 (1 0%) reported that the commander 
contacted them, and only 1 of the 41 (2%) reported that another officer in their chain of 
command contacted them. Additionally, only 1 of the 41 (2%) reported contact by the unit 
retention sergeant. 
Response 
Figure 23. Frequency of ‘who personally contacted you’ after the reservist exited the 
unit. 
I Ic. What did the person that contacted you say? 
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As illustrated in Figure 24, of the 41 reservists who were contacted by someone in their unit, 
11 of the 41 (27%) noted that the person who contacted them inquired about their situation 
and the reasons they had missed drill. Twenty percent (8 of 41), however, reported that the * 
individual only quoted the rules and regulations governing missed drills. In another 10 cases 
(24%), the contacting person either asked the reservist, or tried to convince them, to come 
back and participate in the unit. 
Response 
Figure 24. Frequency of ‘what did the chain of command say’ after contacting the 
reservist after he had left the unit 
A cross tabulation of the variables ‘who did you talk to’ and ‘what did they say’ in 
Figure 25 provides more detailed information. Ironically, the individuals in the chain of 
command who have the authority to order a reservist to return to the unit (commander and 
first sergeant) did not do so. Generally, the lower the person was in the chain of command, 





Asked to Retum 
Ordered to Return 
Convinced to Return 
inquired About Sit. 
Tried to Rectify Sit. 
Left Message 
N/A/No Info 
Never Followed Up 
Total 
Other Platoon Squad Retention U/A or Other/ Other 
Cdr Officer ISG Sgt Ldr NCO AdminNCO Friend Recruiter Sgt Total 
1 0 0 0  0 
1 0 0 0  0 
0 0 1 0 0 
4 1 5 10 1 
Figure 25. Cross tabulation of the variables ‘who contacted you’ and ‘what did they 
say’ for reservists who exited the unit 
0 1 0 0 0 2  
0 0 0 1 1 3 
0 0 1 0 0 2  
1 6 3 2 8 41 
2. What would influence a soldier to rejoin a Reserve Unit, and is it related to 
the reason he exited? 
The questions on the interview protocol that address this issue include: 
13b. What, ifanything, would get you to rejoin the Reserve? 
Although 100 reservists responded, only the most fiequent responses are depicted in Figure 
26. Of the 100 respondents, 18 reported nothing would get them to rejoin. Another 8 
reservists did not know, or were not sure what would get them to rejoin. Twelve reservists 
reported that they would rejoin if they could get a new job or a new MOS, and 7 reported 
they would rejoin if they could find a unit closer to home. Only 6 reservists reported they 
would rejoin if the pay increased. A reservist who would join if his pay increased expressed 
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reservists, the reason they exited the unit is directly related to the incentive they identified 
Figure 26. Frequency of ‘what would it take to get you to rejoin the Reserve’ 
A cross tabulation of the variables ‘what would it take to get you to rejoin’ and ‘why 
did you stop participating’ provides information about whether ‘what would influence a 
reservist to rejoin’ is related to ‘why he exited‘. Figure 27 depicts the relevant information 
from the respondents. Of the 100 respondents, 70 named something that would get them to 
rejoin. As illustrated by the bold, italicized numbers in Figure 27, for 2 1 % (1 5 of 70) of the 
that would entice them to rejoin. 
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Figure 27. Cross tabulation of the variables ‘why did you stop participating’ and ‘what 
would it take to get you to rejoin the Reserve’ 
3. What recommendations do unsatisfactory participants have for Army 
Reserve leadership to reduce nonparticipation? 
Figure 28, which only depicts most frequent responses, illustrates that of the ‘1 00 
respondents, 22 reservists recommended increasing the quality of training in the unit. One 
reservist wondered, “what happens when the unit gets called to war and we haven’t been 
training?’’ Seventeen reservists recommended increasing leadership’s interest in and care of 
reservists. One reservist made a suggestion aimed at improving both leadership and training 
when he suggested that leadership “make soldiers feel like part of a team, and feel like 
they’re really accomplishing something.’’ Sixteen reservists recommended that the 
communications channels in the unit be improved. Additionally, the response frequencies 
for the question ‘did the quality of communications influence your leaving’ resulted in 75% 
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of reservists reporting that communications did influence, or somewhat 
influence their decision to leave. Finally, 7 reservists recommended that new reservists 
should be informed of expectations before they report to the unit, and 4 more reservists 
9 
recommended the unit do a better job of integrating new reservists into the unit. One 
reservist reported that “I just didn’t ever feel like I was a member of the unit.” 
1 
I 
Figure 28. Frequency of ‘what suggestion do you have to keep reservists participating 






The discussion includes implications and answers to the subsidiary research 
questions, and finally, the answer to the primary research question. The research questions 
are organized according to the integrated conceptual model presented in Figure 1. As 
mentioned previously, the reservists included in the sample are unsatisfactory 
participants who have failed to fulfill Reserve contract obligations. These reservists may 
have attribution biases which assign blame for their behavior to the institution or to others, 
rather than to themselves. Additionally, it should be recognized that some unsatisfgctory 
participants may be poor performers, which may partially explain the low percentages of unit 
contact after the reservists exited the unit. 
Subsidiary Research Questions 
AnticiDatorv Socialization 
a. What are the sources of infomation about the Army Reserve program, and 
are they accurate? 
The primary sources of information about the Army Reserve program are local 
recruiters and in-service recruiters. More than half of the reservists whose source was an in- 
service recruiter received accurate information, and less than half of the reservists whose 
source was a local recruiter received accurate information. Part of this difference may be 
attributed to the fact that in-service recruiters access prior service soldiers, whereas most 
local recruiters access the majority of non-prior service soldiers. Prior service soldiers have 
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military experience, and thus may not need as much information about the Reserve in order 
to form realistic expectations. In addition, the local recruiter is rewarded for accessing 
reservists, and may portray the Reserve more positively than reality. The resulting overly * 
optimistic view may result in potential recruits developing unrealistic expectations of the 
Reserve. 
b. What are the sources of information about the Reserve unit, and are they 
accurate? 
Over a third of reservists learned about their units from local recruiters. Although 
only a few reservists learned about their units from in-service recruiters, all reported the 
information was accurate, or somewhat accurate. As discussed, the accuracy of the in- 
service recriiters may result fiom the military experience of the prior service soldiers they 
recruit. In contrast, more than 10% of the reservists who learned about their unit fiom a local 
recruiter reported receiving inaccurate information. Additionally, almost a third of the 
reservists reported they received no prior information about their unit from any source. 
Recruiters and other accession sources, however, are not required to brief reservists about 
their units. Currently, the unit is the reservist’s primary source of information through 
orientation briefings, etc. The reservist does not receive that information until he reports to 
the unit for the first time. The reservist has no opportunity to form realistic expectations of 
his unit, and may develop unrealistic expectations based on the generally optimistic 
information initially presented to persuade him to join the Reserve. 
c. What is the role of the local recruiter in anticipatory socialization? 
The role of the local recruiter in anticipatory socialization entails facilitating the new 
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reservist’s encounter with his new unit by escorting the reservist to the unit for his first 
training weekend. Although the recruiter is not required to brief the reservist on the mission 
of the unit, the recruiter is required to escort the new reservist to his unit in accordance with * 
the sponsorship program outlined in USARC Regulation 140-6. Over three-quarters of the 
respondents were accessed by a local recruiter, but only a little more than half were escorted 
by a local recruiter to their new unit. This figure is not surprising, as the recruiter could 
theoretically have to escort several reservists to different units on the same day. Escorting 
the reservist, however, demonstrates to the reservist that the organization cares about his first 
impressions of the unit. 
Encounter 
a. How well does the unit begin to integrate the reservist in the encounter 
stage? 
Generally, the findings indicate room for improvement in the implementation of the 
sponsorship program. Although required by USARC Regulation 140-6, only approximately 
one-third of the reservists received an orientation briefmg. Additionally, just over half of the 
reservists reported they received a sponsor. The assignment of a sponsor, however, is not 
a guarantee the sponsor performs his duties adequately. Almost a quarter of the reservists 
reported the sponsor did a poor job. On a positive note, commanders spoke to almost three- 
quarters of the newcomers, and almost all of the reservists were in-processed within the first 
two training weekends. The requirements of the sponsorship program are designed to 
assimilate the new reservist into the unit as quickly as possible. When these requirements 
are not accomplished, the reservist remains in the encounter stage longer than the first 
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training weekend, which slows the socialization process. As the length of the socialization 
time increases, the soldier is more likely to be dissatisfied, and is more likely to exit because 
he does not feel included in the unit. 9 
b. What is the nature of met and unmet expectations during the encounter 
stage, and do unmet expectations relate to the reason for exiting during this stage? 
Over half of the reservists experienced surprise (unmet expectations), both better and 
worse than expected, during the encounter stage. The significant number of m e t  
expectations indicates the reservist did not receive a realistic preview of the unit. This is not 
surprising, as most of the reservists received no information about the unit prior to their 
arrival. 
The majority of reservists noticed the people in the unit were friendlier than they 
expected, followed by a much smaller number who noticed the leadership was better than 
they expected. Almost a third of the reservists, however, noticed the leadership was worse 
than they expected, followed by almost a quarter reporting the training was worse than 
expected. Generally, based on the data collected, reservists tended to first judge human 
interactions in the unit, rather than unit policies or standards. 
Almost a third of the reservists identified something worse than they expected, and 
then exited for the same reason. These findings suggest that the reasons reservists exit 
during the encounter stage may be related to unmet expectations that have not been resolved. 
Leaders, then, should recognize that the first drill weekend is crucial to the socialization of 
the new reservist. If the first drill weekend is not properly managed, m e t  expectations may 
form the basis for later decisions to exit the unit. 
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c. m a t  attempts did reservists who left during the encounter stage make to 
remedy dissatisfaction, and what actions did leadership take? 
Almost three-quarters of the reservists who left during the encounter stage talked to 
someone about their dissatisfaction. This finding indicates the reservists signaled someone 
9 
of their dissatisfaction. These signals allow leadership the opportunity to identify a 
dissatisfied reservist and take actions to prevent a reservist from exiting. 
Almost half of the reservists spoke to the first sergeant. The first sergeant, then, has 
the most opportunity to identify the dissatisfaction and, if possible, take measures to prevent 
a soldier from eventually exiting the unit. None of the reservists spoke to the commander. 
Lack of involvement may indicate to the reservist that the commander is not interested 
enough in the reservist’s activities to schedule time to talk to him. 
Almost a third of the soldiers spoke to the unit administrator, or the administrative 
sergeant. Ironically, these individuals are not in the formal chain of command. These 
individuals should refer the reservist back to his formal chain of command, as they have no 
leadership obligation to assist the reservist with problems. 
While the reservist is being in-processed during the encounter stage, the platoon 
sergeant may not spend much time with him. The platoon sergeant should periodically 
“check-in” with the reservist to make sure the sponsor is taking care of him, and that there 
are no problems. The platoon sergeant should also ensure the reservist knows the procedures 
to communicate with the chain of command. 
Almost half of the reservists perceived the chain of command ignored them, or did 
nothing to resolve their problems. Leadership, then, must take actions to change this 
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perception and be more receptive to dissatisfied reservists. Leadership needs to demonstrate 
they care and will do what they can to resolve reservists' problems. 
Finally, none of the reservists spoke to'the retention sergeant, whose duties include 
the retention of reservists. Leadership may want to redefine the role of the retention sergeant 
to help in the identification of reservists at risk of exiting the unit. 
Metamorphosis 
a. What is the nature of met and unmet expectations during the 
metamorphosis stage, and do unmet expectations relate to the reasons for exiting during this 
.stage? 
Fewer reservists in the metamorphosis stage, as compared to the encounter stage, 
noticed something was better or worse than they expected. This fmding suggests that based 
on the model, some reservists were able to successfully revise some of their unmet 
expectations during the metamorphosis stage. As in the encounter stage, reservists primarily 
noticed the human interaction processes in the Unit, such as the people, the leadership and 
the training. In addition, the reservists identified problems that were not as evident in the 
encounter stage. Almost 20% noticed that processing was worse than they expected. 
Whereas leadership can generally assume the majority of the dissatisfaction can be attributed 
to leadership and training issues during the encounter stage, more long-term issues, such as 
policies and procedures, evolve as potential problems during the metamorphosis stage. 
The majority of the unsatisfactory participants left during the metamorphosis stage. 
Over time, these reservists could not resolve their dissatisfactions and exited the unit. 
Approximately one third of the reservists identified something as worse than they expected, 
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and exited because of the same unresolved dissatisfaction. Again, leadership must stress the 
importance of accepting and integrating the reservist, and must attempt to identify and 
resolve problems as early in the socialization process as possible. 9 
b. What attempts did reservists who left during the metamorphosis stage 
make to remedy dissatisfaction, and what actions did leadership take to resolve problems? 
~ 
Almost three-quarters of the reservists talked to someone in the chain of command 
about their dissatisfactions. During the metamorphosis stage, however, the majority of the 
reservists talked to their platoon sergeant about their problems. Many still spoke to the first 
sergeant, but again, unlike the encounter stage, several spoke to the commander. The fust 
sergeant consistently remains involved in the problem resolution process and potentially has 
the most influence on a reservist’s decision to exit. Now, however, the platoon sergeant and 
the commander are significantly involved as well. Both the commander and the platoon 
sergeant need to be involved in problem resolution earlier in the socialization process- 
during the encounter stage. These findings suggest that the reservist has developed a better 
understanding of the communications process in the unit, and knows how to utilize the chain 
of command to solve problems. Again, leaders should ensure reservists understand the 
communication channels and the chain of command structure during the encounter stage. 
Over half of the reservists reported the individuals they talked to about their 
dissatisfaction did nothing to resolve the problem, or ignored them. Additionally, almost a 
third of the reservists did not speak to anyone about their dissatisfaction. This finding 
suggests that reservists may have perceived the chain of command as being unapproachable, 
or perceived that the chain of command could not, or would not, resolve the problem. 
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Leaders definitely need to keep the lines of communication open with reservists in the unit, 
and perhaps learn and practice counseling skills. 
- Exit 9 
a. Afier the reservist exited the unit, did anyone personally contact him?- 
Almost 60% of the reservists were not personally contacted by anyone in the unit. 
The majority of reservists who were contacted were contacted by their platoon sergeant. A 
reservist who has exited should be, contacted by every individual in his chain of command. 
Many were contacted by the unit administrator/administrative sergeant, or another sergeant 
in the unit, and told the rules governing nonparticipation or ordered to return to the unit. 
This finding suggests that reservists are being contacted by sergeants who are tasked to 
contact them, rather than someone in their chain of command who should care that the I 
reservist does not want to participate in the unit. 
Although the first sergeant seems to have opportunities in the encounter and 
metamorphosis stages to influence the reservist, few reservists were personally contacted by 
the first sergeant after they exited the unit. Additionally, few were personally contacted by 
the commander. The commander and the first sergeant are missing an opportunity to 
'influence the reservist to return to the unit. The commander and first sergeant are 
figureheads, and a call from either one demonstrates they care about the reservist's decision 
to exit, and want him to return. 
b. What would influence a reservist to rejoin a Reserve unit, and is it related 
to the reason he exited? 
Over 80% of reservists might be influenced to rejoin a Reserve unit. The findings 
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show major influences include a new job or a new MOS, a unit closer to home, and increased 
pay. Additionally, the results indicate that for almost a quarter of the reservists, the reason 
they would rejoin the Reserve is directly related to the reason they exited the unit. For * 
example, some reservists stated they exited because they did not receive the school/MOS/job 
they desired, and would rejoin if they were given a military school, or a new MOS/job. The 
majority of the unsatisfactory participants have already completed initial entry training, and 
are MOS qualified. If the Reserve could accommodate some of these soldiers, training and 
recruiting dollars could be saved by keeping the soldier in the Reserve system. For example, . 
attempting to place a reservist in a unit closer to his home, if possible, would save cost of 
recruiting and training another reservist. 
c. What recommendations do reservists have for Army Reserve leadership 
to reduce nonparticipation? 
I Reservists’ top three recommendations to reduce nonparticipation include improving 
I the quality of training, improving the quality of leadership, and improving the quality of 
I communications in the unit. Poor training is one of the trends which consistently emerged 
throughout the interview process. The findings indicate that, although a reservist may be 
getting paid for attending drill, he values his time and wants to learn. Developing an 
incentive program for good training, and placing a list of training “best practices” on a web 
page, for example, may help leadership .benefit from other unit’s training successes. 
The second trend which consistently emerged is poor leadership. The results indicate 
that many unsatisfactory participants perceived leadership treated them unfairly, and did not 
care about their dissatisfaction. This fmding reinforces the third recommendation-that 
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communications be improved. Improving commuriications in the unit may improve 
reservist’s perceptions of the leadership. Managerial communications modules and 
counseling modules should be included in leadership training 3 
Primary Research Question 
What factors influence reservists to stop participating in Selected Reserve 
unit drills? 
As discussed, many factors influence reservists to stop participating in unit drills. 
The findings indicate, however, that the most influential factors are training and leadership. 
Reservists identified m e t  expectations in training and leadership in the encounter and 
metamorphosis stages of socialization, and many exited because of training and leadership 
issues. Unit leadership exacerbated these problems through little or ineffective attempts to 
rectify the reservist’s problems, as well as inadequate efforts to influence the reservist to 
return to the unit. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The following conclusions are presented based on the discussion in the previous t 
section. 
1. The local recruiter is the reservist’s primary source of information about the 
Reserve Program, however, one-third of the information reservists receive from local 
recruiters is inaccurate. 
2. One in three reservists received no prior information about their assigned unit; 
3. A recruiter did not escort one in three reservists 
to his assigned unit. 
4. Although required by the sponsorship program, approximately one in four 
reservists did not receive an orientation brief, did not meet with the commander, and was not 
assigned a sponsor. 
5 .  Reservists generally noticed the people in the unit were friendlier ‘than they 
expected, and the training and leadership were worse than they expected. 
6.  Poor training was the leading reason one in four reservists exited the 
unit. 
7. The unit fvst sergeant is the primary member of the chain of command 
the reservist speaks to about his dissatisfaction before exiting the unit. 
8. The chain of command failed to resolve problems for one in four 
reservists. 
9. The chain of command personally contacted only half of the reservists 
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who had exited the unit. 
10. If offered various incentives, 82% of the unsatisfactory participants 
would rejoin the Army Reserve. 
1 1. The leading recommendations non-participants have to increase 






This study highlights the fact that retention begins during the recruiting process. 
Provide new reservists realistic and accurate information during the * 
Providing new reservists accurate information and realistic job previews will enable them 
to form realistic expectations of the Reserve, and of the unit. Realistic information may 
reduce the number of m e t  expectations, which may reduce dissatisfaction and prevent 
reservists from exiting the unit. 
a. Enable accession sources to provide realistic job previews so 
new reservists develop realistic expectations. Instead of showing training videos which 
depict training that is the exception rather than the norm, produce trahhg tapes that depict 
a typical drill weekend for an average Reserve unit. Produce a training video that follows 
some new reservists through the in-processing and integration process. 
b. Provide accession sources (in-service recruiters, local recruiters and 
MEPS) standardized fact sheets about the Reserve and specific units that can be provided 
to the new reservist. Reserve fact sheets may include the mission, wiring diagram, 
commander’s philosophy and goals, etc. 
c. Eventually enable all units to have web pages on the Internet so accession 
sources can easily provide new reservists current information about the unit. The accession 
sources could have a computer terminal and modem with access to the Internet, and could 
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allow new recruits to view unit homepages, as well as print a hardcopy of the information. 
2. Have a unit representative escort the new unit member from the accession * 
source. 
Currently, the recruiter is required to escort the new reservist to the unit. The 
findings suggest, however, that the reservist is not always escorted to the unit. Often, the 
recruiter is unable to escort the new reservists he is responsible for to their units due to 
scheduling conflicts. Having a unit representative, possibly the retention sergeant and the 
designated unit sponsor, report to the recruiting station and escort the new reservist will 
ensure the new member is escorted to the unit. Additionally, the unit should expect, and be 
prepared for the new reservist’s arrival. 
3. Develop a unit arrival schedule for new reservists. 
The findings suggest that at times, coordination between the unit and the recruiter 
does not occur, and the unit is not expecting the arrival of the new reservist. One 
recommendation is to study the feasibility of only accepting newcomers every other month. 
A standardized arrival every other month would allow commanders to plan training around 
the arrival of new reservists, as well as enable them to plan and execute the requirements of 
the sponsorship program (plan and conduct orientation briefings and the commander’s talk 
to newcomers, select and train unit sponsors, etc.). 
For example, the recruiter would develop a pick-up schedule for each Reserve unit 
which corresponded to the unit’s drill dates, and a unit representative would report to the 
recruiting station at the designated time every other month to meet and escort newcomers 
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assigned to their unit. With a standardized arrival, the chain of command would be available 
and prepared to execute the requirements of the sponsorship program. This procedure would 
prevent uncoordinated arrivals and sponsorship program failures, which occurred when one 
reservist reported to his unit on a day the unit was conducting an M16 qualification. 
4. Emphasize the importance of the sponsorship program in leadership 
training. 
Leadership training should include the requirements of the sponsorship program, and 
the associated cost and readiness implications of failing to implement the program 
successfully. The training may include a general overview of the stages of socialization and 
expectation theory, as well as the results of this study. The training may also include role- 
playing to demonstrate to leaders the importance of successfully assimilating a new reservist 
into the unit. In particular, the results indicate that it is essential that the new reservists be 
kept busy and well attended to during their first two drill weekends. 
5. The unit retention sergeant’s duties should include the entire scope of the 
retention process, and not just re-enlistment duties. 
Currently, the retention sergeant is primarily tasked with re-enlistment issues. In 
addition to the chain of command’s efforts to contact the reservist, the retention sergeant 
should have a major role in assisting the commander to identify reservists who are at risk of 
exiting the unit. For instance, after a reservist’s fifth unexcused absence, the retention 
sergeant should contact the reservist and try to determine the reasons the reservist is not 
attending drills. The retention sergeant would then inform the commander about the 
reservist’s dissatisfaction. If the commander determines the reservist has a problem, such 
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as transportation, that he cannot resolve, the retention NCO should seek a way to keep the 
reservist as a total force asset, by placing him in another unit or reserve component. The 
commander, however, must first exhaust all local resources to assist the reservist, and should 
only refer those reservists who have a legitimate issue, have a good performance record, and 
are worth retaining. This suggestion also includes the need to create a reward system to 
recognize a “save” to DoD drill strength to offset the current penalty of a loss to the unit.. 
It also recognizes the need to free up more time for the retention NCO (e.g. her only duty 
on drills). 
6. Emphasize the importance of communication in leadership training 
Managerial communications and counseling modules should be included in 
leadership training. The perceptions that leadership was unorganized or uncaring could be 
mitigated if the chain of command ensured the channels of communication were open-up, 
* down, and lateralty. Leadership should keep reservists informed to reduce the stress and 
frustration associated with not knowing what is going on. Counseling training would 
provide leadership the ability to be effective and empathetic listeners, and teach them skills 
to demonstrate caring. 
7. Publicize and reward unit “best practices.” 
Recruiting Partnership Councils are scheduled at different levels in the chain of 
command of the USAR. These councils could be used as a forum to highlight and reward 
unit “best practices,” including leadership, training, and sponsorship initiatives. For 
example, the units may be awarded extra funds to purchase training teams and modules from 
the Readiness Training Center. Additionally, the “best practices” could be published on a 
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web page, similar to the way lessons learned are published by the Center for Army Lessons 
Learned (CALL). 
8. All reserve components should share IRR data and use this as a recruiting 
tool, as 75% of the unsatisfactory participants said they would rejoin a unit if 
certain dissatisfactions were alleviated. 
An unsatisfactory participant represents a loss of training dollars to the Reserve. 
Sharing a database of unsatisfactory participants would allow either the Reserve or the 
National Guard to fill shortages with individuals who may have completed initial entry 
training, or are MOS qualified. For example, if a reservist does not like the Reserve, and will 
not rejoin the Reserve, he may be willing to join the National Guard, as some reservists 
indicated during the course of the interview. If the database resulted in a successful rejoin, 
perhaps the National Guard could pay the Reserve for the accession of the Army Reserve 
unsatisfactory participant, and vice-versa, as an incentive to share information. The Reserve 
components could potentially recoup some of the money invested in training an individual. 
Continuation of the Study 
* 
This study focused on the factors which influenced 100 reservists to exit a unit via 
unsatisfactory participation. A future study will compare experiences of those unsatisfactory 
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APPENDIX 1 




asked by the Army Reserve to talk to some reservists who stopped participating to find 
out the reasons, and what can be done to reduce nonparticipation. Could you take a few 
minutes to talk confidentially to me about your experiences? 


















Survey identification number 
Sex 
Last reserve unit 
MOS in your last Reserve unit? 
How many other Reserve units have you been a member of? 
MOS in the other Reserve units 
Active duty 
Last active duty unit 
MOS on active duty 
Time on active duty 





Distance from home to last Reserve Unit (in minutes) 
p(a). - Distance from home to last Reserve unit (in miles) 
P. Civilian occupation 
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Where did you learn about the Army Reserve Program? 
How accurate was that information? 
What was different than reality? 
3. a. Where did you learn about your unit? 
How accurate was that information? 
What was different than reality? 
b. 
C. 




Take you to the unit? 
Tell you about the unit’s mission? 
Give you the MOS you wanted? 
c(1). If not, why not? 
d. Tell the unit you were coming? 
5 .  a. Why did you join the Army Reserve? 
b. Were your expectations met? 
b(1). If not, why not? 
ENCOUNTER 







Was the unit expecting you? 
Did you get an orientation brief? 
Did the commander talk to newcomers? 
Did they appoint a sponsor to help you? 
If so, did the, sponsor do a good job? 










After you joined the unit, did things go as you expected? 
Was anythmg better than what you expected? 
If so, what was better than you expected? 
When did you notice? 
Was anything worse than what you expected? 
If so, what was better than you expected? 
When did you notice? 
When did you stop attending drills? 
What was your main reason for stopping attendance at drills? 
Was there a second reason you stopped attending? 
Was there a third reason you stopped attending? 
Did you talk about your dissatisfaction with anyone in the chain of 
command? 
If so, who did you talk to? 
What did the person you talked to do about your dissatisfaction? 
EXIT 
After you stopped attending, did anyone personally try to get you to 
return? 
If so, who? 
What did the person who contacted you say? 
Why did& you return? 
I'm gGdg to ask you a couple of questions about the quality of cornmumation in 
your unit. On a scale of one to five, with one being very dissatisfied, and five being 
very satisfied, how satisfied were you with communications with: 
a. Your co-workers? 
b. Your sergeants? 
C. Your commander? 
d. 
a. 
How could communications be improved in the unit? 






If you have rejoined, why did you rejoin? 
What, if anything, would get you to rejoin a unit? 
What, if anything, do you miss  about your unit? 
What, if anything, don’t you miss about your unit? 
Finally, if you could offer one suggestion to the Army Reserve leadership to keep 
soldiers participating in drills with their units, what would it be? 
Thanks for your time. Your comments have been very useful. 
76 
DISTRIBUTION LIST 
Defense Technical Information Center.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
8725 John J. Kingman Road , Ste. 0944 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 22060-6218 
Dudley b o x  Library, Code 013.. .. . .. . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . .. . .. .. .. . .... . . .. . . . .. .. .. .. . ... . . . . . .. .. . . 
Naval Postgraduate School 
411 Dyer Rd. 
Monterey, California 93943-5101 
USA Model Improvement & Study Management Agency ......................................... 
1725 Jefferson Davis Highway 
Crystal Square 2, Suite 808 
Arlington, Virginia 22202 
HQ DA, OC ............................................................................................. 
Rm. 1D416 - The Pentagon 
Washington, DC 203 10-2400 
ATTN: DAAR-PAE 
Research Office, Code 91 . .. . . . .. .. .... .. . .. . .. .. . .... .. . . . . . ... . . .. .. . . .... ... .. . .. .. .. . ... . . . .:... . .. 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5138 
George W. Thomas, Code SM/Te ..................................................................... 
Department of Systems Management 
Naval Postgraduate School 
555 Dyer Rd Rm 333 Bldg 330 
Monterey, CA 93943-5103 
Kathryn M. Kocher, Code SM/Ko ..... . .. . . . . . ... . . .. . . . . . .. .... . . .. ... ... .. .. .. . ... . . . . ..... . ... . . . .. 
Department of Systems Management 
Naval Postgraduate School 
555 Dyer Rd Rrn 372 Bldg 330 
Monterey, CA 93943-5103 
Bob Barrios-Choplin, Code SM/Bc ..................................................................... 
Department of Systems Management 
Naval Postgraduate School 
555 Dyer Rd Rrn 239 Bldg 330 









COL B.J. Thornburg ... . . ... . . . . . . . . ... . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. . . . .. .. . . . . .. . . . . . .. .. .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
5 Pritchard Court 
Stafford, VA 22554 
2 
